Treaties dominate international energy law, meaning the rules of public international law that govern energy activities and their effects. This raises the question about the relationship of treaties, and particularly those on energy trade, with the law of international responsibility. This article uses a European angle to contextualise the importance of this question. EU Member States are major oil and gas importers from third states. The EU and Member States are party to treaties with third states that apply to energy trade, carriage and investment. Whether treaty obligations, undertaken and owed to the EU and/or Member States vis-à-vis third states, are of bilateral, interdependent or community interest nature determines whether the EU and/or a Member State have standing to invoke the responsibility of a third state for a breach of an energy-related obligation as well as their remedial rights and the means by which they may implement responsibility. At the same time, because energy access is vital for states, suspending compliance with obligations in the energy sector is often preferred as a permissible response to wrongfulness carrying significant effects and persuasiveness. The nature of obligations of international energy law may determine whether suspending compliance with such obligations can be a lawful countermeasure either by the EU and/or Member States against a third state, or by a third state against the EU and/or Member States.
Introduction
The European Union (EU) Member States are major oil and gas importers. The EU imports 90 per cent of the oil and 66 per cent of the gas that it consumes. 1 The dependence of EU Member States on imports of different energy sources has, to varying degrees, existed for decades. The exporting and transit states of these sources of energy have also changed over time.
2 Despite this dependence, it was not until the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), that a new Title on Energy was added. 3 The Title comprises only one provision-Article 194-which operates as a separate basis for energy-related EU legislation. However, even before the insertion of this provision, EU energy law had been expanding mainly with a view to creating an internal energy market and securing oil and gas supplies, 4 with further developments to be expected as the European Commission has made a new proposal for an 'Energy Union' .
5
Given the need for energy imports, the relationship of the EU and Member States with third states in the energy sector has been perceived as critical for the development of the internal energy market, as well as for securing supply. 6 The modern significance of this relationship is illustrated by the effects of the 2009 gas crisis on the European gas market that occurred owing to a dispute concerning exports of gas from Russia to Ukraine and being transited through Ukraine. 7 In terms of factual effects, industrial and household consumers were left without gas for days. 8 In terms of legal impact, the conduct of third states triggered the This study analyses the relationship between treaties concerning energy activities and the law of international responsibility. More specifically, the study focuses on the treaties that regulate the trade of energy. It explains that the nature of treaty obligations, which are undertaken and owed to the EU and/or Member States vis-à-vis third states, determines whether the EU and/or a Member State has standing to implement the responsibility of a third state for a breach of an energy-related obligation. It also determines which remedial rights they have and by which means they can implement the responsibility of a third state. At the same time, because access to energy is vital for states-their economies and the survival of their populations depend on it
11
-suspending compliance with obligations in the energy sector rank highly among the permissible responses to wrongfulness carrying significant persuasiveness. The nature of obligations of international energy law, meaning the rules of public international law that govern energy activities and their effects, 12 may determine whether suspending compliance with such obligations can be a lawful countermeasure. Such countermeasure may be taken either by the EU and/or Member States against a third responsible state, or by a third state against the EU and/or Member States. These issues are of exceptional practical importance to the EU, its Member States and its neighbourhood, as they lie at the heart of energy security considerations. Which Contracting Parties to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) or Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, were entitled (2016) Vol 5 Issue 2 Danae Azaria to resort to dispute settlement under the ECT or the WTO Agreement against Ukraine or Russia in relation to the 2009 incident alleging breaches of transit or export obligations (respectively)? 13 Would Ukraine have been able lawfully to suspend compliance with its transit obligations under the WTO or the ECT in response to Russia's unlawful annexation of Crimea with consequences for the EU and its Member States? Can a Member State, which is party to a bespoke pipeline treaty with a third state, suspend energy flows via the pipeline in response to a breach of an obligation owed to it by that third state?
The following analysis will first determine the nature of some primary obligations of international energy law that are of relevance to EU and/or Member States. Second, it will examine how secondary rules on energy-related countermeasures take into account the nature of primary obligations.
14 The analysis will place international energy law and the energy security concerns of the EU and Member States within the broader field of public international law. The European angle is a context that assists in better understanding the application of international responsibility in the context of international energy law.
From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Energy Law: Treaties of European Concern
In early January 2009, the transit and export of gas to EU Member States were interrupted arguably contrary to Ukraine's transit obligations (under the WTO Agreement and the ECT) and Russia's export obligations (under the ECT). Yet, there First, some obligations are 'bilateral' . These obligations are owed in pairs between the parties. When they are grounded in multilateral norms, such as a multilateral treaty, they may be called 'bilateralisable' . In the latter case, the multilateral norm creates bundles of bilateral relationships. 21 An example is that of innocent passage through the territorial sea. 22 In case of a breach, the individually injured state may invoke responsibility, including by recourse to countermeasures.
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Second, other obligations are 'interdependent' , meaning obligations owed to a group of states collectively but premised on 'global reciprocity' . 24 Non-performance by one permits everyone else not to perform-a paradigmatic example is obligations of disarmament. Under the ASR, breaches of a certain character may change radically the position of all other states to whom this type of obligation is owed with respect to the further performance by those other states of the obligation.
25
Accordingly, the breach allows all other states to which the obligation is owed to invoke responsibility, as injured states, including by recourse to countermeasures.
26
Third, community interest obligations, which are obligations owed indivisibly to all states for the protection of a collective interest (erga omnes obligations) or to a group of states established for the protection of a collective interest of the group (or even for a wider common interest) above the individual interests of the group (erga omnes partes obligations). 27 These are genuinely multilateral obligations. In US-Tax Treatment for 'Foreign Sales Corporations', the Arbitrator did not deal with standing, but with the quantitative amount of the countermeasure agreed between the parties to the dispute. He explained that the prohibition of the subsidy under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) was an erga omnes obligation. 54 Presumably, the Arbitrator meant erga omnes partes given that the obligations are binding only on WTO members. However, his reasoning does not support the suggestion that WTO obligations in general (or obligations arising from the SCM Agreement specifically) are erga omnes partes. He substantiated his finding by reference to the effects of the measure in question, rather than the obligation's nature and the treaty's object and purpose: 'once such a measure is in operation, its real world effects cannot be separated from the inherent uncertainty that is created by the very existence of such an export subsidy' .
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Therefore, GATT obligations may be better classified as bilateralisable, while the rules on standing, as developed under the DSU, permit any WTO member to resort to the DSU in case of breach of a WTO obligation.
56 This is fitting for international and regional energy markets given the factual interdependence of oil, gas, and electricity prices as well as of producers and consumers. Having examined WTO Agreement obligations that may apply to energy trade, the following section discusses the obligations under the ECT.
The Energy Charter Treaty
The ECT is the first sector-specific multilateral treaty governing numerous aspects of the energy sector: eg trade in The nature of ECT obligations has yet to be addressed in the publicly available ECT case law. The following sections examine some ECT obligations separately. They demonstrate that ECT obligations vary in terms of their nature. This difference in nature has implications for standing to invoke responsibility either by recourse to ECT dispute settlement procedures, or by recourse to countermeasures, where the latter are not excluded by lex specialis in the ECT. 
Investment Protection Obligations
The ECT investment obligations in Part III and the dispute settlement provisions of Article 26 apply solely in relation to investors bearing the nationality of an ECT Contracting Party in relation to an investment in the Area of another (host) ECT Contracting Party. They do not apply (by virtue of the ECT) to foreign investors who do not bear the nationality of an ECT Contracting Party. They also do not apply to investors that are nationals of an ECT Contracting Party in relation to investment made in the Area of that ECT Contracting Party. It could be argued that the manner in which the protection of investors of another Contracting Party is widened because the definition of 'investment' (ECT Article 1(6)(b)) requires the host Contracting Party to treat locally incorporated companies in conformity with ECT investment obligations, thus leading to the multilateralisation of the investment obligations. 60 However, the purpose of such a provision is not to treat foreign and domestic investors in the same manner, with a view to protecting corporate entities per se; but to protect the interests of as many investors of each Contracting Party as possible. It could also be argued that the manner in which the most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment works in practice means that the investors of numerous Contracting Parties may be affected by a breach of the investment obligations and that this could mean that investment obligations should be considered erga omnes partes. 61 However, the MFN treatment obligation is characterised by an exchange of treatment, and reflects predominantly the individual interest of each Contracting Party to see its own nationals protected abroad, rather than a community interest that involves the protection of all commercial entities within a Contracting Party's jurisdiction.
Seen through these lenses, the ECT investment obligations rest on foreign nationality (that of another Contracting Party) and on a predominantly individual interest of each ECT Contracting Party to see their nationals protected abroad. They may be better classified as bilateralisable. 
Trade and Transit Obligations
There is no evidence that the ECT trade and transit obligations are not bilateralisable. 63 Given that trade and transit, as a general matter, are based on reciprocal exchanges between treaty parties (unless there is evidence to the contrary), it is arguable that they are owed in pairs between ECT Contracting Parties.
Incidents have come up where violations of ECT obligations concerning transit (Article 7) and exports (Article 29) have either occurred or the lawfulness of the measures taken by the transit and exporter/importer ECT Contracting Party could at least have been challenged. However, since on none of these occasions did Contracting Parties make any claims of 'relatively formal form' for the cessation of an internationally wrongful act, no concrete conclusions can be drawn from their practice as to the nature of the trade and transit obligations. the TAP Treaty is in furtherance of the ECT. 66 All these provisions may indicate that parties do not intend to depart from their ECT obligations. However, it is unclear that they included such treaty provisions specifically owing to the erga omnes partes nature of the ECT trade and transit obligations. In light of the lack of evidence to the contrary, it is better to argue that ECT trade and transit obligations are bilateralisable.
Environmental Obligations
Article 19 on 'Environmental Aspects' sets out erga omnes partes obligations. [1996] any environmental harm occurring outside the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party where the harmful energy activity takes place, as well as with environmental harm occurring within the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party, in whose jurisdiction the harmful energy activity takes place. In the absence of a requirement connecting jurisdiction and harm, there is no evidence that the obligation in Article 19(1) is based on a bilateral relationship between Contracting Parties, whose environment would be affected by a harmful energy activity in another Contracting Party. Rather, the obligation protects a community interest-the environment per se. It is better classified as an obligation erga omnes partes.
Dispute Settlement Provisions and Standing
The ECT contains numerous dispute settlement mechanisms-a general interContracting Party arbitration mechanism in Article 27; an investor-Contracting Party arbitration provision in Article 26; a special transit conciliation procedure in Article 7(7); a special provision for the settlement of environmental disputes in Article 19(2) and a special procedure for settling trade disputes concerning 
Bespoke Pipeline Treaties between EU Member States and Third States
In the post-Cold War period, the trend to conclude bespoke pipeline treaties has been increasing. A number of reasons may have prompted this trend, but this question falls beyond the scope of this study. 75 This treaty practice is by no means unique to Europe. Numerous such treaties have been concluded in relation to cross-border and transit pipelines in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa. 76 However, the treaty practice involving EU Member States is of interest because of the context in which it is taking place. First, it can be seen as a reaction to the need to diversify routes and sources in the aftermath of the 2009 gas crisis that occurred in Europe owing to the gas transit and export dispute between Russia and Ukraine. Second, it will continue to be observed-if not to increase-as many of these projects are eligible for funding by the EU, when characterised as 'projects of common interest ' under use of the term 'plurilateral' here is only descriptive of the treaties' form (which is multilateral) and does not entail legal consequences under the law of treaties in relation to the topic discussed here. Each treaty and each treaty obligation has to be interpreted separately. The following analysis focuses on obligations concerning uninterrupted energy flows via the pipelines.
Plurilateral Bespoke Pipeline Treaties
The Nabucco Agreement requires treaty parties 'not to permit or require the Interruption of gas transportation in the Nabucco (pipeline)' . 91 The treaty's object and purpose is to ensure the 'security of supply (since) this is necessary for the welfare and security of each citizen and (…) States Parties are therefore determined to act in a spirit of solidarity to achieve collective energy security' . 92 The TAP Treaty requires parties not to interrupt flows of gas through the pipeline. 93 The Preamble of the Treaty states that the Treaty forms part of an effort to promote cooperation in ensuring the reliable supply of gas from states in Central Asia to the EU, none of which is party to the Treaty, and 'to create uniform (…) conditions and standards for the (…) construction, and operation of (the Pipeline)' . 94 Additionally, the Treaty categorically prohibits unilateral denunciations and inter se modifications.
95
The obligations not to interrupt transportation of energy via an integral pipeline system, which crosses the territory of numerous states, could be classified as 'interdependent obligations' . What connects interdependent obligations is their negative nature: they require states, for instance, not to acquire arms or not to acquire nuclear weapons. As in relation to interdependent obligations, parties to bespoke pipeline treaties have a strong interest in cessation of the international wrongful act pertaining to the interruption of energy carriage, restitution and assurances of non-repetition rather than in compensation. Their interest is to guarantee the 'regime' by re-establishing energy flows. Owing to these features, this could be seen as the natural classification of obligations concerning energy transportation via pipelines in the context of multilateral bespoke pipeline treaties unless there is evidence to the contrary, which is the case for the Nabucco Agreement and the TAP 91 Nabucco Agreement (n 38) art 7. 92 ibid art 1.2 (emphasis added). 93 TAP Treaty (n 39) art 7. 94 ibid Preamble (emphasis added). 95 ibid art 12.
Treaty. The features of the Nabucco Agreement and the TAP Treaty demonstrated above support the proposition that the obligations concerning uninterrupted energy flows therein are erga omnes partes. They are established primarily for a common interest (collective energy security), including a wider common interest of states beyond the treaty parties, and they are intended to set uniform standards for a regional project.
This section has shown that two plurilateral bespoke pipeline treaties that EU Member States have concluded with third states establish obligations erga omnes partes and thus all treaty parties have standing to invoke responsibility (although it is questionable whether those other than the injured state may resort to countermeasures). 96 The following section touches on the bilateral treaties that EU Member States and third states in the Balkan region have concluded with Russia concerning the South Stream pipeline.
Bilateral Bespoke Pipeline Treaties
In addition to multilateral treaties governing the construction and operation of one physically indivisible pipeline that crosses the territory of numerous states, the practice of states also reveals compounds of bilateral treaties concluded for such projects. A paradigmatic example of European interest is the bilateral treaties concluded between Russia, a gas exporting state, on the one hand, and each transit and importing state for the South Stream pipeline on the other hand, some of which are EU Member States. 97 These include provisions concerning the construction and operation of the pipeline, including an obligation not to interrupt energy carriage. Owing to the vehicle used to establish such obligations (bilateral treaties), the obligations under each treaty are bilateral and are owed between the parties to them. There is no evidence in the treaties that EU Member States have concluded with Russia or in the circumstances of their conclusion that there is an intention to establish rights (eg concerning uninterrupted transportation) for third states through whose territory the pipeline will be constructed or for a wider group of states. 98 96 See (n 24-32). 97 See (n 40). For compatibility of the provisions in these treaties with EU law provisions, see analysis in section 2.3 above. 98 VCLT (n 34) art 36.
State Responsibility and Community Interest in International Energy Law

Interim Conclusions
Within the ambit of international energy law, community interest obligations appear in the treaty practice of Member States (eg obligations in bespoke pipeline treaties with third states, such as the Nabucco Agreement and the TAP Treaty) and in some multilateral treaties to which the EU is itself a party (eg ECT environmental obligations). However, the EU and Member States have also undertaken bilateral or bilateralisable obligations in the energy sector. WTO obligations apply to energy trade and are bilateralisable; but generous standing has been afforded to all WTO members to invoke responsibility for breaches of WTO obligations under the DSU. The ECT contains some bilateralisable obligations, such as those concerning trade, transit and investment. Furthermore, EU Member States conclude bilateral treaties with third states in the energy sector (eg with Russia for the South Stream pipeline). This section has explained that community interest obligations appear along with bilateral and bilateralisable obligations within the scope of international energy law that are of particular interest for the EU and Member States, and how this determines standing to implement the responsibility for a breach of these obligations. The following section examines whether lawful countermeasures, as a means of implementing international responsibility, can take the form of suspending compliance with energy-related obligations.
Suspending Compliance with Community Interest Obligations in International Energy Law
This section examines energy-related countermeasures. Countermeasures are a means of implementing international responsibility. 99 They involve the suspension of compliance with an international obligation, but because they are taken in response to a previously internationally wrongful act, countermeasures are one of the circumstances that preclude wrongfulness. 100 The following analysis assesses whether, and if so how, the community interest nature of obligations plays a role in determining the lawfulness of a countermeasure in the form of suspending compliance with treaty obligations relating to the energy sector. This analysis is important because resorting to energy-related countermeasures may be preferred among the available responses to wrongfulness in the UN era, given their significant effects on the responsible state and their corresponding persuasiveness. Section 3.1 examines whether countermeasures in the form of suspending compliance with treaty obligations in the energy sector are unavailable. Section 3.2 examines whether countermeasures in the form of suspending compliance with obligations in the energy sector may not meet the conditions of lawfulness of countermeasures to the extent that the latter take into account community interest obligations.
Displacing Countermeasures as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness
The argument that countermeasures as circumstances precluding wrongfulness may be displaced by lex specialis is founded on two separate bases-treaty language that displaces countermeasures, as circumstances precluding wrongfulness; and the nature of the obligations whose performance is to be suspended implicitly displaces countermeasures. First, some treaties concerning energy trade and investment contain security exceptions-for instance, GATT Article XXI and ECT Article 24. The relationship between security exceptions and circumstances precluding wrongfulness under the law of state responsibility has been the focus of a series of investor-state arbitrations against Argentina on the basis of bilateral investment treaties to which Argentina is party. While a number of arbitral tribunals have dealt with this issue differently, 101 the more persuasive position is that when the language used in a security exception is (or resembles substantially) 'nothing shall prevent the parties from' , as is the language used in GATT Article XXI and ECT Article 24, such language suggests that the exception delineates the scope of primary treaty obligations. Conduct within the scope of the exceptions is not in breach of the treaty obligations. In contrast, circumstances precluding wrongfulness are part of secondary rules and preclude the wrongfulness of a conduct that would otherwise be wrongful: meaning conduct that would not fall within the scope of such security exceptions. 102 This was also the reasoning of the PCIJ in the Railway Traffic Advisory Opinion (1931).
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Most bespoke pipeline treaties do not contain security exception provisions, as is the case of those examined here. However, some contain other language that may displace countermeasures, as circumstances precluding wrongfulness. The TAP Treaty permits non-performance of treaty obligations only by prior consent of all parties. This rule is located in a provision that deals with the treaty's operation that is separate from the provisions requiring states not to interrupt energy flows. 104 The argument could be made that this treaty provision displaces countermeasures under the law of international responsibility taken in this particular form (meaning in the form of interrupting energy flows). The provision overlaps with countermeasures in that they both relate to suspension of performance of obligations, but it deviates from countermeasures, which are unilateral and are not premised on prior consent by the responsible state or any other state. Such interpretation would entail the displacement of any unilaterally operational circumstance precluding wrongfulness. Second, as a separate argument, the community interest nature of some obligations of international energy law could be seen as entailing ipso facto nonsusceptibility to unilateral countermeasures. In his work on state responsibility, ILC Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz suggested that, owing to their indivisible nature, erga omnes partes obligations may not be susceptible to countermeasures. 105 However, his proposal was not taken up by the ILC-it was rather changed into a clause that severs the preclusion of wrongfulness towards the responsible state from the nonpreclusion of wrongfulness towards the non-responsible affected states. 106 The approach of the ASR in relation to this issue may cast some doubt on the argument that countermeasures in the form of suspending performance of erga omnes partes obligations are displaced owing to the indivisible nature of such obligations.
The following section examines whether suspending performance of energyrelated obligations meets the conditions of lawfulness of countermeasures under custom, assuming that countermeasures are not displaced by lex specialis.
Conditions of Lawfulness of Countermeasures under Customary International Law
Countermeasures, in order to be lawful, have to meet a number of conditions under customary international law. 107 One of these conditions is that a countermeasure has to be targeted against the responsible state. 108 This condition-according to the ILC-is based on the 'relative preclusion of wrongfulness' . 109 The wrongfulness of the countermeasure is precluded vis-à-vis the responsible state, but not vis-à-vis a third non-responsible state. For instance, if Ukraine suspends compliance with transit obligations that it owes to Russia as a countermeasure for the latter's internationally wrongful act, while at the same time it owes a transit obligation to the EU and/or Member States (eg GATT Article V or ECT Article 7), the wrongfulness of interrupting transit vis-à-vis Russia may be precluded, but it will not be precluded vis-à-vis the EU and Member States simply owing to Russia's wrongful conduct. In such situations, reacting states are faced with a dilemma. They may respond against the responsible state, but they will have to make reparations to third (not responsible) states; or they may abstain from resorting to countermeasures against the responsible state (at least in this particular form), owing to the burden of having to make reparations to third states. On the other hand, other conditions of lawfulness of countermeasures may be attuned to the community interest nature of international obligations. Some reflect the need to protect community interests per se; others may coincidentally allow the consideration of the community interest nature of a primary obligation when assessing the lawfulness of a countermeasure. Two conditions of the lawfulness of countermeasures are discussed in the following sequence-that countermeasures shall not affect fundamental human rights obligations and that they have to be proportionate to the injury suffered.
to protect the right to life, freedom from degrading treatment or the right to health by providing energy apply in such an extraterritorial manner. No case law or state practice as yet supports (albeit it does not preclude) the view that obligations to take positive measures to protect human rights apply in such manner. Even assuming arguendo that the 'jurisdiction' threshold was to be fulfilled, 121 it would have to be proven that the effect on the human rights of individuals in the targeted state is the result of the countermeasure. Such a link depends on the facts, and may not be easily identified. Furthermore, the reacting state may argue against the existence of such a link because the targeted state has not taken the necessary measures to protect the human rights of individuals within its own territory. For example, the reacting state could have mitigated the effects of an energy crisis by taking pre-emptive or other measures such as storage or entering into energy sharing mechanisms like the International Energy Agency mechanism of oil stockpiling and demand restraints or the EU Gas Security mechanism. 122 Hence, in the current state of international law, the rule that countermeasures cannot affect human rights obligations is unlikely to result in countermeasures in the form of interrupting energy flows being unlawful.
Proportionality
Under customary international law, countermeasures have to be proportionate to the injury suffered, taking into account the rights in question. 123 The following sections explain how the condition of proportionality of countermeasures accommodates community interest obligations. First, the effects on human rights 120 For counterarguments that may support the extraterritorial application of obligations and the conduct discussed here, see Azaria (n 7) 243-44. 121 As a separate matter, there is no evidence that a stricter jurisdictional link is required for the customary right to life and freedom from inhuman treatment, or the right to health (assuming that it attains customary status) other than the one applicable to human rights treaties. obligations of the targeted state will be discussed, and second, how the condition of proportionality takes into account the community interest nature of obligations whose performance is suspended as a countermeasure. In relation to the former issue, the question as to the existence of a human right to energy will be touched on. The analysis is put in the context of treaties to which all EU Member States are party (as at 28 September 2016): the ECHR and the European Social Charter (ESC). Countermeasures in the form of suspending compliance with exports or transit of energy can affect the ability of the targeted state to perform its own human rights obligations vis-à-vis individuals within its own territory. These include obligations to respect human rights by abstention and obligations to protect human rights by positive action. A countermeasure that has such an effect is likely to be disproportionate to the injury suffered, taking into account the rights in question. Since this criterion covers the rights of the injured and responsible states, 125 the argument can be made that it also covers the ability of the targeted state to comply with its human rights obligations. It is in this context that the question arises as to whether there is a 'human right to energy' . There is no human rights treaty specifically establishing the right to energy, or referring to energy in connection with the rights established in the treaty. 126 However, the interpretation of existing treaties may establish obligations not to arbitrarily deprive access to energy in relation to vulnerable individuals (especially those dependent on the state) and especially in cases where such deprivation has no connection to the conduct of the individuals in question (eg non-payment of utility bills). Such an argument can also be made in relation to customary human rights law, where available. Additionally, subsequent ECtHR case law has clarified that the 'absence of (…) a purpose (to humiliate) cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3' . 129 Moreover, a breach of Article 3 may occur 'in circumstances (where the individual is) wholly dependent on State support, (and is) faced with official indifference when in a situation of serious deprivation or incompatible with human dignity' . 130 Interruption of access to energy for heating, sanitation, light, cooking or the use of essential medical equipment to individuals dependent on the state may amount to a violation of their right to be free from degrading treatment under ECHR Article 3. They may also amount to a breach of the right to health, as part of the right to private life. 131 Moreover, in relation to the ESC, the European In extreme situations, where the targeted state is placed in a position where it cannot comply with its negative and positive obligations concerning the right to life, the right to be free from degrading treatment, and the right to health, 135 owing to an interruption of energy exports or transit by a reacting state, such countermeasure would be disproportionate.
In Relation to Targeting Community Interest Obligations
As a separate matter, targeting community interest obligations may not meet the condition of proportionality. The reasoning of the ICJ in Gabčνkovo-Nagymaros supports this interpretation. Hungary had violated a bilateral treaty with Slovakia, which required both States to construct works for energy development on a part of the River Danube crossing the two States. Slovakia unilaterally responded by diverting a part of the river and by constructing alternative works along the course of the diversion. Slovakia claimed that its conduct was a lawful countermeasure against Hungary's prior breach. The ICJ found that '[t]he effects of a countermeasure must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking account of the rights in question' .
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The Court did not explain the criteria by which it assessed proportionality. It could be argued that the Court's criterion was the aim pursued by Slovakia when resorting to the alleged countermeasure. Factually, Slovakia's measures meant that the adverse effects of Hungary's conduct were wiped out and Slovakia managed to enjoy unilaterally the benefits it would have enjoyed had Hungary performed its treaty obligations. 137 Thus, the measure's aim was not to induce Hungary to comply with its obligations but rather an attempt to benefit from non-compliance. Although this interpretation is defensible, especially in light of the facts, the Court's reasoning in paragraph 85 of the Judgment allows for a different interpretation. The ICJ alluded to the findings of the PCIJ in River Oder concerning the creation of a 'community of interest on a navigable river [which] becomes the basis for a common legal right' (of navigation) of riparian states on international rivers. 138 Although it did not specifically link the community interest nature of those obligations to the assessment of the lawfulness of the countermeasure in question, it made an analogy between the common legal right of navigation and the modern developments of international law concerning non-navigational uses of international watercourses. This reasoning allows for the argument that the community interest and hence indivisible nature of the obligation whose performance is being suspended as a countermeasure may be a qualitative criterion for measuring proportionality. 139 For instance, given that the obligations concerning the protection of the environment in ECT Article 19 and the obligations concerning uninterrupted energy flows under the Nabucco Agreement and the TAP Treaty are erga omnes partes, suspending their performance would not constitute a lawful countermeasure because it would not meet the condition of proportionality.
Conclusion
Reciprocity and the making of bilateral or bilateralisable obligations dominate international rules concerning the energy sector. While multilateral treaties that apply to energy trade (eg WTO Agreement) or specific to the energy sector (eg ECT) have been concluded since the end of the Cold War, the rise of multilateralism has not necessarily brought about community interest obligations in this field. For instance, GATT obligations and ECT obligations concerning trade and investment are bilateralisable. 
State Responsibility and Community Interest in International Energy Law
However, to suggest that this is the whole picture would be misleading. The EU founding treaties and, by implication, the secondary sectoral legislation on energy do not establish reciprocal undertakings between EU Member States according to Van Gend Loos. 140 But, even outside EU law, as a species of international law, contemporary treaty practice is growing in the form of 'plurilateral' bespoke pipeline treaties, and EU Member States have participated in this development. Some of these treaties contain obligations erga omnes partes concerning uninterrupted energy flows. At the same time, the community interest nature of international obligations may be relevant in determining whether suspending compliance with them can be a lawful countermeasure. Some conditions of lawfulness of countermeasures protect community interests per se; others incidentally allow the consideration of the community interest nature of a primary obligation when assessing whether the conditions of lawfulness of a countermeasure have been met. The condition that countermeasures cannot affect fundamental human rights obligations is unlikely to render unlawful countermeasures in the form of interrupting energy supplies to the responsible state, because the human rights obligations of the state taking such countermeasures are unlikely to apply in such extraterritorial situations. However, the condition that countermeasures must be proportionate to the injury suffered may not be met in two cases. First, if the energy-related obligation, performance of which is suspended, is of a community interest nature, this nature is a criterion for measuring proportionality. Second, countermeasures in the form of interrupting energy flows may curtail the ability of the targeted state to comply with its own human rights obligations.
